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Appellee, Federal National Mortgage Association, (FNMA) submits this brief of 
appellee in response to the brief of appellant (Opening Brief) submitted by appellant 
Lorraine Sundquist (Sundquist) on this appeal. 
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of restitution, ordering Appellant, 
Sundquist to vacate the property. This Court granted a petition for interlocutory appeal 
and, therefore, it has jurisdiction under Utah R. App. P. 5. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Court should limit this appeal to one issue - Was it appropriate for the trial 
court to grant FNMA possession of the property pending the outcome of the litigation, 
where, although Sundquist has challenged FNMA's right to possession of the property 
due to the fact that FNMA's title was acquired through a the trustee's sale conducted by 
an entity which Sundquist alleges lacked statutory authority to conduct that sale, 
Sundquist (debtor/property owner) had undeniably defaulted under the loan, lacked the 
ability to bring the loan current, and could present no evidence showing that her interests 
were prejudiced by the use of an allegedly unauthorized foreclosure trustee? 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The issue was raised below when the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine possession of the property during the litigation's pendency. See R. 195, 
Hearing Trans, (all pages). The ultimate issues regarding ReconTrust Company, N.A.'s 
(ReconTrust) authority to foreclose and FNMA's title to the property were raised by 
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Sundquist, but were not argued in any detail. Moreover, they were not determined by the 
trial court. Therefore, those issues are not presented on this appeal. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 78B-6-810, particularly subsections(2) (a) and (b),1 which provide: 
(a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment of rent or 
for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in Subsection 78B-6-802.5, 
the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon request of either party, within 10 days 
after the day on which the defendant files the defendant's answer. 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the 
litigation's pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be 
adjudicated without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and 
enter judgment on the merits. 
12 U.S.C.A. § 92a, Trust Powers. See Addendum, Ex. B. 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7 Multi-state fiduciary operations. 
(a) Acting In A Fiduciary Capacity In More Than One State. Pursuant to 
12 U.S.C. § 92a and this section, a national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any 
state. If a national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity in a particular 
state, the bank may act in the following specific capacities: 
1
 The full statute is set forth in the Addendum, Ex A. 
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(1) Any of the eight fiduciary capacities expressly listed in 12 U.S. C. 
§ 92a(a), unless the state prohibits its own state banks, trust companies, and other 
corporations that compete with national banks in that state from acting in that 
capacity; and 
(2) Any other fiduciary capacity the state permits for its own state banks, 
trust companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks in that 
state. 
(b) Serving Customers In Other States. While acting in a fiduciary capacity in 
one state, a national bank may market its fiduciary services to, and act as fiduciary for, 
customers located in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relationships that include 
property located in other states. The bank may use a trust representative office for this 
purpose. 
(c) Offices In More Than One State. A national bank with fiduciary powers 
may establish trust offices or trust representative offices in any state. 
(d) Determination Of The State Referred To In 12 U.S.C. § 92a. For each 
fiduciary relationship, the state referred to in Section 92a is the state in which the bank 
acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship. A national bank acts in a fiduciary 
capacity in the state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, executes the 
documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions 
regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets. If these activities take place 
in more than one state, then the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for 
Section 92a purposes is the state that the bank designates from among those states. 
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(e) Application Of State Law. 
(1) State laws used in Section 92a. The state laws that apply to a national 
bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a are the laws of the state in 
which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity. 
(2) Other state laws. Except for the state laws made applicable to national 
banks by virtue of 12 U.S.C § 92a, state laws limiting or establishing 
preconditions on the exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national 
banks. 
Utah Code § 57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications, particularly Sections 
(l)(a)and(3).2 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place 
within the state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with 
the trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or 
payoff the obligation secured by the trust deed; 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required 
by both the trust deed and by law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the 
trust deed; or 
2
 The full statute is set forth in the Addendum, Ex. C. 
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(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for 
the purchase of the property secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or 
insurance company authorized to do business and actually doing business in 
Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and 
actually conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States; 
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31 A, 
Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state; 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state, 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or 
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the 
trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsections (l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
Utah Code § 57-1-23. Sale of Trust Property - Power of trustee - Foreclosure of 
Trust Deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsections 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in 
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the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for 
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a 
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision for it in the trust deed. 
Utah Code § 57-1-23.5. Civil liability for Unauthorized Person who Exercises Power 
of Sale. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee 
under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an 
unauthorized person. 
(2) (a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to 
the trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the 
unauthorized sale or $2,000, whichever is greater. 
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing 
plaintiff the plaintiffs costs and attorney fees. 
{22838842;!} 6 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order awarding occupancy to FNMA during 
the pendency of the unlawful detainer action brought by FNMA. Because the ultimate 
issues regarding title to the property and possession of the property at the conclusion of 
litigation have not been finally resolved by the trial court, they are not presented on this 
appeal 
By way of background, Sundquist defaulted on a loan secured by a trust deed 
attached to certain real property in March 2009. The beneficiary under the deed of trust 
appointed ReconTrust as successor trustee and initiated non-judicial foreclosure. 
ReconTrust noticed and conducted the foreclosure sale, and FNMA was the purchaser. 
On May 18, 2011, ReconTrust issued a trustee's deed in favor of FNMA. 
Sundquist did not challenge the foreclosure at the time it occurred. Instead, when 
FNMA sought possession through this unlawful detainer action, Sundquist asserted that 
because ReconTrust was not a trustee properly authorized to exercise the power of sale, 
FNMA's title was void and it was not entitled to possession of the property. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Code §§ 78B-6-
810(2)(a) and (b)(i) to determine which party would have possession of the property 
during the pendency of the litigation. At that hearing, it heard evidence that Sundquist 
had defaulted and would be unable to bring the loan current or even to post a bond to 
cover the missed payments in the event that the trial court ultimately granted occupancy 
to FNMA at the conclusion of this litigation. Based upon the evidence and argument 
{22838842;!} 7 
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presented at the occupancy hearing, the trial court awarded possession of the property to 
FNMA pending the outcome of this litigation. 
The trial court did not decide whether ReconTrust was authorized to conduct the 
trustee's sale or whether, even if it was not a proper trustee, FNMA obtained valid title. 
Instead those issues were asserted by Sundquist via counterclaims that have yet to be 
resolved by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On or about May 2, 2006, Sundquist executed a deed of trust on the property 
located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, Utah (the Property). R. 2. Sundquist 
defaulted on that loan by failing to make payments in March of 2009, and has not made 
payments or brought the loan current since that time. R. 195, Hearing Trans., 5:13-6:6. 
After being appointed successor trustee by the beneficiary under the deed of trust, 
ReconTrust commenced foreclosure proceedings. R. 7, 37, 46. FNMA was the buyer at 
the foreclosure sale and on or about May 18, 2011, ReconTrust issued a trustee's deed 
conveying title to the Property to FNMA. R. 7-8. The trustee's deed indicates 
compliance with the statutory notice and procedural requirements for conducting a non-
judicial foreclosure sale. Id. 
After issuing an appropriate notice to quit (R. 12), on June 13, 2011 FNMA filed 
the complaint in this action, seeking possession of the property, fair rental value for the 
time Sundquist remained in the home (trebled by statute), damages and other relief. 
{22838842;!} 8 
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R. 1-18. Pursuant to Utah Code §§ 78B-6-810 (2)(a) and (b)(i), the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on June 27, 2011 to determine which party would have possession of 
the Property during the pendency of the litigation. R. 195, Hearing Trans. 
During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court inquired whether Sundquist was in 
default under the loan at issue and was informed that she had not made payments for two 
and a half years. R. 195, Hearing Trans. 5:13-6:16. When asked if Sundquist could 
make up the missed payments or, at a minimum, post a bond to cover the missed 
payments, Sundquist's counsel eventually conceded that she could not make up the 
missed payments and that he had no information (whether admissible evidence or 
otherwise) to indicate Sundquist could post a bond. Id., at 7:4-8:15. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the trial court awarded FNMA possession pending litigation and issued an 
order of restitution setting forth its decision on June 28, 2011. R. 71 -74. 
On June 30, 2011, Sundquist sought permission to take an interlocutory appeal of 
that order. R. 64-87. This Court granted the petition for interlocutory appeal on August 
5,2011. R. 113. 
Sundquist has made three attempts to pursue counterclaims (one original and two 
amended counterclaims) relating to her allegations that ReconTrust was not an authorized 
trustee and, therefore, FNMA does not have title to the Property. In response to an order 
to file a more definite statement regarding the first amended counterclaim (R. 161), 
{22838842;!} 9 
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Sundquist filed a second amended counterclaim on or about October 19, 2011. R. 162-
171. FNMA answered the second amended counterclaim in December of 2011.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the litigation, Sundquist has mounted a poorly-founded attack on FNMA's title 
to the property. Contrary to Sundquist's arguments, the mere assertion that FNMA lacks 
title does not mean that FNMA cannot maintain the action, or that the trial court cannot 
award possession of the property during the litigation's pendency. The statute addressing 
immediate occupancy hearings makes no such exception, and a concurring opinion from 
an opinion by the Utah Supreme Court supports the trial court's decision to hold an 
immediate occupancy hearing, despite the fact that Sundquist questions FNMA's title. 
The evidence and argument presented at the immediate occupancy hearing 
demonstrated that the balance of equities and potential prejudice related to immediate 
occupancy favored granting possession to FNMA. At the time of the hearing, Sundquist 
had been in default on her home loan for nearly two-and-a-half years. She offered no 
proof that she could post a bond, and offered no arguments that would indicate she was 
likely to prevail on the merits. Therefore, the evidence and argument demonstrated that 
FNMA would likely be prejudiced if Sundquist were allowed to maintain possession of 
the property during the pendency of the litigation, and the trial court correctly awarded 
temporary possession to FNMA. 
3
 This fact does not appear in the record because the appeal was taken before the answer 
was filed. The salient point is that the litigation on the counterclaims is at an early stage 
and has not been reduced to a final judgment. 
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A final order was never entered, and many issues in the case, including whether 
ReconTrust was an appropriate foreclosure trustee and, if it was not, the consequences of 
that irregularity, were not decided by the trial court. Despite the fact that the trial court 
has not ruled on these issues, Sundquist has attempted to argue them on this appeal. This 
Court need not address those issues here, except to confirm that FNMA's meritorious 
arguments and defenses on those claims demonstrate that the trial court did not act 
arbitrarily in deciding to award possession to FNMA. Nonetheless, because they were 
raised by Sundquist, FNMA has felt obligated to set forth its rebuttal 
Ultimately, the Court should find that the trial court was correct to hold an 
immediate occupancy hearing, and that its decision to grant possession to FNMA during 
the course of this litigation was correct given the arguments and evidence presented 
during that hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Occupancy to FNMA Pending a 
Final Determination as to the Remaining Issues in the Litigation. 
A. The Trial Court can Make a Provisional Determination 
Regarding Immediate Occupancy Despite Sundquisfs Challenge 
to ReconTrusfs Authority to Exercise the Power of Sale. 
FNMA's right to possession of the Property is governed by Utah Code § 78B-6-
810, which dictates that an evidentiary hearing on immediate occupancy be held within 
10 days of service of the unlawful detainer complaint to determine which party is entitled 
to possession of the property during the pendency of the litigation. See Utah Code §§ 
78B-6-810 (2)(a) and (b)(i). By its nature, and by the express language of the statute 
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(nthe court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the litigation's 
pendency" (emphasis added)), this remedy is provisional. Thus, the ruling from which 
this appeal is taken is a limited, provisional ruling that FNMA should have possession of 
the Property pending the outcome of the litigation.4 
Sundquist relies on Bichler v. DEI Systems, Inc., 2009 UT 63, 220 P.3d 1203, to 
argue that the trial court should not have granted occupancy to FNMA pending a final 
ruling on her claim that ReconTrust lacked authority to conduct the foreclosure sale. 
Opening Brief, at 23-26. Bichler, however, does not support her argument. In Bichler, 
the Supreme Court found, that a final judgment (emphasis added) regarding possession 
cannot be entered until the trial court has resolved counterclaims and defenses that go to 
the issue of right to possession. Bichler, 2009 UT 63, fflf 29-30. 
The majority opinion did not address whether a trial court can or should determine 
possession during the litigation's pendency when there are counterclaims or defenses that 
could affect the ultimate right of possession. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice 
Nehring, joined by Justice Durham, opined that, even if a tenant's counterclaim might 
affect the final ruling on occupancy, "the court may preliminarily decide the issue of 
occupancy during the pendency of the litigation under section 78B-6-810(2)(b)." 
4
 Although the trial court has authority to issue a final decision at the conclusion of the 
immediate occupancy hearing, see Utah Code § 78B-6-810(2)(b)(ii), there is no 
indication that the trial court intended the order of restitution in this case to be the final 
word regarding possession of the property. See R. 195, Hearing Trans., Court's Ruling, 
11:2-4 (noting that the trial court would deny the motion to vacate the eviction "at this 
point."). Sundquist seems to have recognized this, as her argument centers around 
whether FNMA could assert "a right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency." 
Opening Brief, at 21, title to Section I.C. 
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Id., at [^ 41. Thus, the concurrence in Bichler expressly supports the rule that the trial 
court can award immediate possession despite the pendency of claims potentially 
affecting the ultimate right of possession. 
B. The Trial Court Appropriately Considered the Evidence and 
Arguments Related to Immediate Occupancy and Determined 
that FNMA should be Granted Possession of the Property 
During the Litigation. 
Neither Bichler nor any other Utah case appears to address the standard or factors 
to be considered during a disputed immediate occupancy hearing. However, it stands to 
reason that a trial court can consider a variety of factors, including the likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits, as well as the overall equities and potential prejudice under the 
facts presented. Here, from the evidence presented at the immediate occupancy hearing, 
it is clear that the trial court acted appropriately in determining to grant possession of the 
property to FNMA during the pendency of this litigation. 
During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court inquired whether Sundquist was in 
default under the loan at issue and was informed that she had not made payments for two 
and a half years. R. 195, Hearing Trans. 5:13-6:16. When the court asked if Sundquist 
could make up the missed payments or, at a minimum, post a bond to cover the missed 
payments, Sundquist's counsel eventually conceded that she could not make up the 
missed payments and that he had no information to indicate Sundquist could post a bond. 
Id, at 7:4-8:15. Sundquist's counsel's statements reveal that Sundquist suffered no 
prejudice by virtue of ReconTrust's role as trustee. Thus, as set forth below, even if 
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ReconTrust were not authorized to exercise the power of sale, the remedy would not be 
5 
rescission. 
6 Based upon the facts presented to it, the trial court correctly awarded possession 
during the pendency to FNMA, but it made no final determination as to possession or the 
merits of Sundquist's claims. Therefore, Sundquist's argument that the counterclaims and 
defenses "must be resolved before a final determination of possession may be made,1' is 
inapplicable to this appeal. See Opening Brief, at 25. This case concerns only a 
determination regarding possession of property while litigation is pending. Contrary to 
Sundquist's assertions, she would have a meaningful remedy in the unlikely event that the 
trial court ultimately determined that she is entitled to possession. 
5
 Regarding the merits of Sundquist's claim that ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise 
the power of sale, the trial court heard argument from both sides but made no ruling on 
the issue. ((R. 195, Hearing Trans., 8:18-9:19). 
6
 The hearing below was an evidentiary hearing, and the trial court's questions regarding 
Appellant's default were clearly intended to help it determine whether Appellant suffered 
any actionable prejudice related to ReconTrust's role as trustee. The Court of Appeals 
normally defers to a trial court's decision regarding factual findings, such as its 
determination regarding the potential prejudices to the parties here. "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT App 167, f5, 982 P.2d 581, 
citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
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C. Sundquisfs Challenge to FNMA?s Right to Seek Immediate 
Occupancy does not Deprive the Trial Court of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction. 
In Sections LC and II of her brief, Sundquist reframes the argument that FNMA 
lacks authority to seek possession of the property as a jurisdictional/standing argument 
and claims "FNMA's lack of standing to assert a right to occupancy is a subject matter 
jurisdiction defect." Opening Brief, at 26. This argument is illogical. It presumes that 
FNMA's title is invalid. However, that issue has not been decided. Sundquist raised that 
argument for the first time in this case. 
As set forth below, FNMA's title is valid. However, at a minimum, the trustee's 
sale is presumed valid and FNMA has standing to assert its rights unless and until the 
trustee's deed is set aside. Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., 143 P.2d 1158, 1160 
(Utah 1987) (a trustee's deed is presumed valid, though the presumption may be 
rebutted); see also Vines v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 302 Ga. App. 353, 691 S.E.2d 242 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is the sole owner of the 
property until and unless the sale is set aside). 
II. Even if ReconTrust is an Unauthorized Trustee, FNMA has Valid title 
to the Property and Sundquist has no Right to Rescind the Trustee's 
Deed. 
The trial court has not made a final determination regarding whether Sundquist's 
challenge to ReconTrust's authority affects the validity of the trustee's deed. Therefore, 
the issue is not ripe for appeal. Nonetheless, Sundquist has challenged FNMA's title to 
the Property on this appeal, so FNMA will address the issue here. In her brief, Sundquist 
merely assumes that ReconTrust cannot pass valid title if it is an unauthorized trustee 
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under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(3). However, because Sundquist cannot show prejudice 
as a result of ReconTrust's role, and the legislature specifically chose not to include 
rescission as a remedy for the unauthorized exercise of the power of sale, Sundquist has 
no right to rescind the trustee's deed, even if the court ultimately determined that 
ReconTrust was not an authorized trustee. 
A. Because Sundquist Cannot Show that a Foreclosure Sale by 
ReconTrust Prejudiced her Interests, There are No Grounds for 
Rescinding the Trustee's Deed. 
Utah law generally provides that "a [trustee's] sale once made will not be set aside 
unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or 
unfair dealing." RMLifestyles LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290, f 16, 263 P.3d 1152. 
,f[T]he remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate only in cases which reach 
unjust extremes" (emphasis added). Id. citing Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). To rescind a trustee's deed, the borrower must produce 
"evidence to show that the irregularity they claim resulted in their being unable to protect 
their interests." RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, f 17; see also Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 
UT 47, f^ 37, 86 P.3d 699 (refusing to set aside a trustee's sale because the debtor failed to 
satisfy her burden). 
RM Lifestyles was another case in which the borrowers attempted to defend 
against an unlawful detainer action by arguing that the trustee's deed was void due to 
irregularities in the foreclosure process, specifically, the recording of a notice of default 
by a substitute trustee who had not yet been appointed as trustee. RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT 
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App 2905 f^ 15. There, this Court ruled that it did not need to reach the issue of whether 
there were irregularities in the foreclosure process because the borrowers had not met 
their burden of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights. Id, at ffl| 17-18. 
Similarly, in this case, even if ReconTrust lacked the power of sale7 under U.C.A. 
§ 57-1-21(3), that would not be grounds to set aside the trustee's deed since Sundquist has 
not pled facts that would show "unjust extremes" resulting from ReconTrust's role. 
Moreover, during the evidentiary hearing on immediate occupancy, it was clear that 
Sundquist is in default and is financially unable to bring the loan current. Thus, she is 
subject to foreclosure and ReconTrust's role as trustee did not prejudice her ability to 
protect her interests.8 Although the ruling on that issue is not final, the award of 
immediate occupancy to FNMA reflects the fact that Sundquist has not been prejudiced 
by ReconTrust being foreclosure trustee and, thus, she ultimately is not likely to prevail. 
B. The Legislature Chose Not to Include Rescission of the 
Foreclosure Sale as a Remedy for the Unauthorized Exercise of 
the Power of Sale. 
Finally, the legislature has recently passed a statute establishing the remedies for a 
foreclosure sale conducted by an unauthorized trustee. The recently enacted Utah Code § 
FNMA emphasizes that ReconTrust was a trustee authorized to conduct the sale 
pursuant to the National Banking Act, which pre-empts Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-
1-23 to the extent those statutes would bar ReconTrust from exercising the power of sale. 
That argument has not been decided in this case but is set forth below. 
Obviously, foreclosure is against her interests. However, as this Court made clear in 
RM Lifestyles, M [although having the Property sold at a trust deed sale affected the 
[borrowers'] property interests, [they] produced no evidence to show that the irregularity . 
. . resulted in their being unable to protect their interests." RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 
290, f 17. 
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57-1-23.5 provides that the remedy for an "unauthorized sale" is statutory damages 
against the trustee. It does not provide any right of rescission. It is an elementary 
principle of statutory construction that where certain remedies are set forth by statute, it is 
presumed that no other remedy is available. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 
U.S. 701, 732, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2721 (U.S. 1989) ("A frequently stated principle of 
statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or 
remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other 
remedies55); see also Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 410-411, 118 S.Ct. 
1408, 1409 (U.S. 1998) ("Since a statutory rescission right could cloud a bank's title on 
foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting 
recoupment of damages."); Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 855 (Utah 2004) (holding 
that the existence of a provision providing a private right of action reveals legislative 
intent that plaintiffs seek relief under only that provision). Accordingly, Sundquist has 
no right to demand rescission of the foreclosure sale. 
The legislature had every opportunity to provide that the exercise of the power of 
sale by an unauthorized trustee is null and void, but it chose not to do so. Instead, the 
legislature recognized that an unauthorized person might conduct the sale9 and it 
9
 Utah Code § 57-1-23.5 provides the remedies for an "Unauthorized sale," which it 
defines as "the exercise of a power of sale by an unauthorized person." Utah Code §57-
1-23.5(b) (emphasis added). An "unauthorized person" is defined as "a person who does 
not qualify as a trustee under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv)." Utah Code § 57-1-
23.5(a). If an unauthorized person could not, as a practical matter, conduct a foreclosure 
sale, the legislature would have not have phrased the statute in this manner. Instead, it 
could have referred to an "attempted" or "purported" exercise of the power of sale, or it 
could have simply referred to it as an "attempted conveyance" by an unauthorized person. 
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provided the only remedy of "actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the 
unauthorized sale or $2,000, whichever is greater," plus attorneys' fees and costs. Utah 
Code §57-1-23.5. 
The legislature's intent is clear and in agreement with pre-existing case law. 
Setting aside a trustee's deed due to irregularities in the foreclosure process is an 
extraordinary remedy that will not be granted unless the debtor can show that the 
irregularity subjected it to unjust prejudice. 
C. Sundquisfs Citation To Cases From Other Contexts and Other 
Jurisdictions Cannot Overcome the Clearly-Stated Rules Found 
in the Applicable Statutes and Utah Precedent. 
Sundquist's citation to cases from other states and cases in other contexts does not 
alter this result. First, her argument that FNMA could not acquire title to the Property 
because ReconTrust had no title to convey is simply wrong. See Opening Brief, at 19. 
ReconTrust was a properly appointed trustee, the dispute in this case is addressed only to 
whether ReconTrust was authorized to exercise the power of sale. Utah Code § 57-1-
21(l)(a)(ii) and (iii) allow depository institutions and corporations authorized to conduct 
a trust business to act as trustee under a trust deed. If these sections were interpreted not 
to allow a national bank such as ReconTrust to act as trustee, they would be preempted 
because they clearly allow state depository institutions to act as trustee. See Cox v. 
ReconTrust Company, N.A., 2011 WL 835893, at *6 (D. Utah, March 3, 2011) (agreeing 
with this conclusion, which neither party disputed, but finding that it did not answer the 
question of whether ReconTrust could act as foreclosure trustee due to the fact that Utah 
did not authorize state depository institutions to exercise the power of sale). 
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Thus, Sundquist cannot dispute that ReconTrust was a proper trustee and, as 
trustee, it had title to the property. Though Sundquist makes no effort to distinguish 
between authority to act as trustee and authority to exercise the power of sale, it is clear 
that her arguments, which are based upon Utah Code § 57-1-23, question only whether 
ReconTrust had legal authority to convey the title it indisputably possessed. See, e.g., 
Opening Brief, at 15. 
The cases cited by Sundquist for the proposition that FNMA's conveyance from 
ReconTrust is void miss the point. She relies primarily upon Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 
460 Mass. 762, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011), in which the court ruled that a party cannot 
acquire good title from a trustee under a mortgage where the trustee who conducted the 
foreclosure sale was not appointed as trustee until after it made the conveyance. 
Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 772-773. However, that decision was based heavily on two 
facts not presented here. 
First, the court relied heavily upon the fact that the plaintiff acquired his title 
through the defendant's default on a mortgage, as opposed to a trust deed. Id., at 774-
775. As the District of Utah recently noted in rejecting a party's reliance upon authority 
pertaining to mortgages in a trust deed case: 
Plaintiff fails to understand that, although similar, mortgages are legally 
different from trust deeds. As the Utah Code Annotated explains: Unlike a 
trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is not a title-conveying instrument. The 
Mortgagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's interest is a lien on the 
property to secure payment of a debt. A trust deed is similar to a mortgage 
in that it is given as security for the performance of an obligation. However, 
a trust deed is a conveyance by which title to the trust property passes to the 
trustee. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Marty v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 2010 WL 4117196, 5 (D. Utah, 
October 19, 2010), quoting Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 n. 1. 
Second, as noted above, the trustee in Bevilacqua had not actually been appointed 
as trustee, and the property records revealed this problem. Based upon this fact the court 
ruled that the purchaser could not be a bona fide purchaser and, thus, did not reach the 
issue of whether the quitclaim deed from the trustee was actually void. See Bevilacqua, 
460 Mass. at 777-779. 
None of the remaining cases relied upon by Sundquist addresses a deed of trust, 
trustee's deed or non-judicial foreclosure in general, and they are wholly insufficient to 
overcome the case law and legislative intent directly applicable to the facts of this case 
discussed above. Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, and Davis v. Young, 2008 
UT App 246, 190 P.3d 23, address whether a transfer in violation of a trust instrument is 
void, while Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244, involved an 
unauthorized lien. They are not relevant to the trustee's deed at issue here. 
Moreover, the selective citation to Ockey for the proposition that "a thing is void 
which is done against the law at the very time of doing it," see Opening Brief, at 20, 
ignores the remainder of that case. Ultimately the Supreme Court found that the contract 
at issue, which was entered as an ultra vires act by a trustee, was not void because: 
(1) "no statute declares ultra vires acts by trustees absolutely void as against public 
policy," and (2) "the trustee's actions only affect Ockey - they did not harm the general 
public." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, f^ 24. In this case, the legislature has actually addressed the 
consequences of a trustee's sale by an unauthorized trustee and has determined that the 
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remedy should be damages, not a void transfer or rescission. See § II. B., supra. In 
addition, as in Ockey, even if ReconTrust lacked authority to conduct the trustee's sale in 
this case, the only potential harm was felt by Sundquist, though, as set forth in Section I 
above, there is no evidence that even she was harmed given her two-plus years of default 
on the loan and inability to cure. 
III. ReconTrust Was a Properly Appointed Trustee with Authority to 
Exercise the Power of Sale. 
The trial court has not made any determination regarding whether ReconTrust had 
power, as trustee, to conduct the foreclosure sale in this case. Thus, the issue is not ripe 
for appeal. Moreover, as set forth above, a determination on that issue would relate only 
to a claim for damages against ReconTrust under Utah Code § 57-1-23.5, not to whether 
FNMA has title to the Property. Notably, Sundquist has chosen not to add ReconTrust as 
a party in this action. 
Once again, however, Sundquist has raised that issue on this appeal, and for that 
reason FNMA will address the issue in this brief. As set forth below, the Utah Code 
provisions that purport to prohibit ReconTrust from acting as a foreclosure trustee are 
preempted by the National Banking Act (NBA), as interpreted by the regulations found at 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7. 
A. Utah Law Cannot Preclude ReconTrust from Acting as a Trustee. 
Sundquist asserts that ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee with the power of sale 
under U.C.A. §§ 57-1-21(3), 57-1-23. See Opening Brief, at 7, 11-12, 14-17. Her 
argument fails because the statutory sections upon which Sundquist relies are preempted 
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by the NBA as implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. Specifically, ReconTrust is a national 
banking association operating under the NBA, which specifies that the state law 
applicable to ReconTrust's authority to act as trustee is the State law where the bank is 
"located" (12 U.S.C. § 92a (a)). ReconTrust is "located" in Texas and, under the NBA 
and implementing regulations, it must conform its activities to Texas law. To the extent 
that Utah law imposes additional requirements on ReconTrust, it is preempted by the 
NBA and the OCC's regulations implementing the statute, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. 
1. The National Bank Act Grants ReconTrust The Federal 
Right To Act As Trustee For Utah Properties Without 
Reference To Utah Law. 
ReconTrust is a federally chartered national bank association (i.e., a national 
bank). It operates under the NBA, 12 U.S.C. §§21 et seq.9 and is regulated by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). See Cox v. ReconTrust Company, N.A., 2010 
WL 2519716, * 5 (D. Utah June 11, 2010) ("there is no dispute that ReconTrust is a 
national bank governed by the National Bank Act5'). Here, ReconTrust was acting in its 
capacity as a national bank when it served as a trustee and began sale proceedings against 
the Property. Accord Cox, 2010 WL 2519716 at *5. Thus, ReconTrust's authority is 
derived from federal law. However, under the NBA, federal law looks to the state law 
where the national bank is "located" to govern trustee powers. In this case, as set forth 
below, Texas law is the relevant state law to which this Court must look to determine 
ReconTrust's trustee powers. 
Section 92a(a) of the NBA gives the OCC the authority to grant national banks, 
like ReconTrust, the federal "right to act as trustee, executor, administrator . . . or in any 
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other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations 
which come into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of 
the State in which the national bank is located" when such federal grant of authority is 
"not in contravention o f the laws of that State. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). After national banks 
were permitted by Congress to branch across state lines in 1994, the OCC addressed the 
issue of national banks5 interstate trust operations by promulgating, after notice and 
comment, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. 
Section 9.7 applies a regime analogous to the one that the Supreme Court had 
previously approved in the context of national banks' interstate lending operations, see 
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 
(1978). Specifically, national banks have, since Marquette, been permitted to adopt the 
interest rate of their "home state," i.e., the state in which the national bank is "located," 
and to export that interest rate to "host" states, notwithstanding host state usury laws. In 
the interstate trust context, given that Section 92a(a) uses similar language to Section 85 
referencing the law of the state where the national bank "is located," the OCC adopted a 
similar process to allow national banks to conduct their fiduciary trust operations on a 
nationwide basis with reference to their home state law. See 12 C.F.R. §9.7 (b), (d) and 
(e). 
In this regard, the OCC has interpreted Section 92a to provide that national banks, 
like ReconTrust, "may act in a fiduciary capacity in any state." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(a). 
"A national bank acts in a fiduciary capacity in the state in which it [1] accepts the 
fiduciary appointment, [2] executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, 
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and [3] makes [the] discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of 
fiduciary assets." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1), "[t]he State laws 
that apply to a national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a are the 
laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity." 
The OCC has interpreted Section 92a to provide that a national bank may still act 
as a trustee for property located in those states in which the national bank does not 
perform the three functions listed in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d): "While acting in a fiduciary 
capacity in one state, a national bank may market its fiduciary services to, and act as [a] 
fiduciary for, customers located in any state, and it may act as [a] fiduciary for 
relationships that include property located in other states." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(b). In such 
instances, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1), "[t]he State laws that apply to a national 
bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a are the laws of the state in which 
the national bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity." 
Here, ReconTrust "acted in a fiduciary capacity" in relation to the Property (as 
defined in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d)) in the State of Texas. ReconTrust foreclosure documents 
involving Sundquist's property were executed in Texas. See R. 46 (Notice of Trustee's 
sale, executed by Gadalia Estremera-Caquias in Richardson, Texas).10 Indeed, nothing in 
the record or in Sundquist's brief indicates that Utah is where ReconTrust accepts its 
Other ReconTrust documents related to the foreclosure were also executed in Texas 
and contain Texas return addresses, indicating ReconTrust's trust operations at issue 
occur in Texas. Because the trial court has never made a final decision regarding 
ReconTrust's authority to foreclose, those documents are not part of the record on this 
appeal, demonstrating again the problems with Appellant raising on interlocutory appeal 
issues that have not been decided below. 
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fiduciary appointment, executes documents creating the fiduciary relationship, or 
makes discretionary decisions. Accordingly, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1) "[t]he 
state laws that apply to [ReconTrust's] fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a 
are the laws o f Texas, not Utah. Indeed, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(2), host state 
laws, such as those of Utah, "limiting or establishing pre-conditions on the exercise of 
fiduciary powers are not applicable to national banks,5' including to ReconTrust. 
Texas law permits national banks, state banks, trust companies, and other 
corporations to act as trustee under deeds of trust and to exercise the power of sale 
with regard to such deeds of trust. Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 32.001, 182.001;Tex. 
Prop. Code Ann. §§ 51.0001, 51.0074. Thus ReconTrust did not act in 
"contravention of State law" of the State in which it is "located" for purposes of 
12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, when it performed the trustee sale of the 
Property. 
2. Because Utah Law Purports to Prevent ReconTrust 
From Exercising Its Federally Granted Trust Powers, 
Those State Laws are Preempted By Operation Of The 
Supremacy Clause. 
"In the area of national banking, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
nature of a preemption analysis is different than in other areas of law. While there is a 
general presumption that state laws are not preempted by federal law, this presumption 
does not apply in the context of national banking." Cox v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 2010 
WL 2519716 (D. Utah June 11, 2010), citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) 
("[A]n 'assumption' of non-preemption is not triggered when the State regulates in an 
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area where there has been a history of significant federal presence," such as national 
banking.). 
The Supreme Court has held that state law is "ordinarily" preempted by the 
National Bank Act and OCC regulations when it "prevents" a national bank from 
exercising its powers under federal law. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 
517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). Here, ReconTrust has the federal right, "[w]hile acting in a 
fiduciary capacity in one state, [to] market its fiduciary services to, and act as [a] 
fiduciary for, customers located in any state, and [to] act as [a] fiduciary for relationships 
that include property located in other states." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(b).11 As ReconTrust is 
"acting in a fiduciary capacity" in Texas, it may serve as a trustee for property located in 
Utah pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(b), without reference to Utah's requirements, including 
those set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) 
and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e). Any interpretation of the Utah statutes that would prevent 
ReconTrust from acting as foreclosure trustee, would prevent ReconTrust from 
exercising this federal authority under Section 92a as interpreted by Section 9.7. As a 
result, under Barnett Bank, such an interpretation of the Utah statute at issue is 
preempted.12 
11
 A June 13, 1986 OCC Interpretive Letter addressed a national bank acting as a trustee 
under a deed of trust and found that "act[ing] as trustee under deeds of trust in favor of 
[a] Bank as beneficiary" and "conducting] trustee sales" are "permissible for a national 
bank as an aspect of trust powers granted by 12 U.S.C. § 92a." OCC Interpretive Letter 
(June 13, 1986) (Addendum, Ex. D) 
12
 Even were the Court to look to Utah as the state in which ReconTrust is "located" for 
purposes of Section 92a(a), Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23 would still be 
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The OCC regulations mandate this conclusion. "Federal regulations have no less 
pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to 
exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine 
whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily." Fidelity Federal 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (U.S. 1982). 
The regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 make clear that the only state law that may 
be applied to the fiduciary activities of a national bank are the state laws that apply 
"by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a," i.e., "the laws of the state in which the bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1). As discussed above, the applicable "State" 
with regard to ReconTrust in this case is the State of Texas, which is a state that allows 
ReconTrust to conduct trustee sales. Regarding any "other state laws," the OCC 
regulations provide that any other "state laws limiting or establishing preconditions 
on the exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national banks" 12 C.F.R. § 
9.7 (e)(2). The OCC confirmed this position in numerous interpretative letters, including 
preempted under the anti-discrimination principles of Section 92a(a). Specifically, Utah 
law allows title insurance companies to act as trustee with the power of sale. See U.C.A. 
§§ 57-1-23, 57-l-21(l)(a)(i), (ii) and (iv). Section 92a(a) prevents such discrimination by 
giving national banks the federal right to exercise trust powers where "corporations 
which come into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of 
the State in which the national bank is located." This anti-discrimination principle is 
confirmed by binding and longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Missouri ex rel 
Burnes National Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17, 24 (1924) (Holmes, J.) ("State cannot lay 
hold of its general control of administration to deprive national banks of their [federal 
trust] power to compete that Congress is authorized to sustain."). 
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finding preempted a Utah requirement "that completely prohibited] [a national] Bank from 
engaging in fiduciary activities." OCC Interpretive Letter No. 866 at 10 (Oct. 9, 1999).13 
3. Recent Decisions from the District of Utah have Found 
that Federal Law Governs ReconTrust's Authority to 
act as a Trustee with Respect to Utah Properties and 
that Utah Code § 57-1-21 is preempted. 
In 2008, in Zabriskie v. ReconTrust Company, No. 08-155 BSJ (Nov. 12, 
2008) (Addendum, Ex. E), Judge Jenkins held that Section 57-1-21 was preempted by 
the federal Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) with respect to ReconTrust, which at 
the time was a subsidiary of a federal savings association. Id. at 7-14. Specifically, 
the court held that ReconTrust "may act as a trustee to the same extent to which state 
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete with federal savings 
associations are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which ReconTrust is 
located. Here, ReconTrust is located in Texas. Under Texas law, state banks and 
trust companies are permitted by statute to act as a trustee for a foreclosure sale." Id. 
at 10. Accordingly, Zabriskie held that "[b]ecause U.C.A. § 57-1-21(3) prohibits or 
restricts a federal savings association from exercising its federal powers to act as a 
13
 See also, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1103 at 3-4 (Sept. 18, 2008) ("a national 
bank may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property located in other 
states" and the OCC's "regulations further provide that with the exception of those 
state laws specifically referenced in Section 92a, any other state laws limiting or 
establishing preconditions on the exercise of fiduciary powers by a national bank are 
not applicable to national banks." The interpretive letter concludes that "[t]he North 
Carolina law imposing these requirements is preempted for national banks with 
fiduciary powers because the requirements directly conflict with the powers of national 
banks to act in a fiduciary capacity granted under federal law by section 92a and the 
OCC's regulations.") (citations omitted); see also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 872 at 5 
(Oct. 28, 1999) (providing that "a national bank may act in those fiduciary activities 
provided that the law of the state in which the bank is located does not prohibit 
competitors of national banks from conducting those fiduciary activities. A national 
bank also may act in any other fiduciary capacity in which national banks' competitors 
may act under the laws of the state where the national bank is located."). 
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trustee, the Court finds that it conflicts with federal law and is preempted by HOLA 
and the regulations promulgated [thereunder]." Id. at 12. The same analysis is 
applicable in this case under the NBA, which employs the same interstate trust 
regime as HOLA. 
More recently, in Coleman v. ReconTrust et al.9 the District of Utah ruled that 
the powers granted to ReconTrust under Section 92a are coextensive with the powers 
granted by Utah state law to ReconTrust's competitors and thus "[t]he federal issue . . .is 
whether ReconTrust is a competitor of Utah attorneys or title insurance companies/' 
Coleman v. ReconTrust et al9 2:10-cv-1099, 2011 WL 835893 (March 3, 2011 D. 
Utah) (Addendum, Ex. F).14 The court deferred ruling on the issue until the parties could 
conduct discovery and fully brief the issue. Although FNMA disagrees with the Coleman 
ruling, even if the District of Utah's analysis in that case were correct, it would, at most, 
be an additional reason for finding that the issue of ReconTrust's authority is not ripe for 
this appeal, since the parties have not taken the first step towards addressing "whether 
Between Zabriskie and Coleman Judge Waddoups issued two decisions in a case titled 
Cox v. ReconTrust, both of which indicated, that ReconTrust's actions were governed by 
the NBA, and that claims based on state laws prohibiting ReconTrust from acting as 
foreclosure trustee were preempted. Cox v. ReconTrust, 2011 WL 835893 (D. Utah 
March 3, 2011); Cox v. ReconTrust Company, N.A., 2010 WL 251976, * 5 (D. Utah June 
11, 2010). The March 2011 Cox decision granted the Cox defendants' motion to dismiss 
and denied Cox's motions for partial summary judgment, to amend her complaint, and 
for a preliminary injunction pending appeal—all with prejudice as to Cox's 16-10a-1501 
claim and without prejudice as to Cox's "trustee powers" (i.e., U.C.A. § 57-1-21) claim. 
Id. at *7. The decision was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, but the appellants ultimately 
dismissed the appeal before a decision could be rendered. Docket, Cox v. ReconTrust, 
No. 10-4117. 
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ReconTrust is a competitor of Utah attorneys or title insurance companies," before the 
trial court. 
FNMA is not alone in disagreeing with Coleman. In the most recent federal 
court decision to address ReconTrust's authority to act as foreclosure trustee, the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah agreed that, because ReconTrust 
acts as trustee in Texas, "the state laws that apply to ReconTrust by virtue of Section 
92a are those of Texas, rather than Utah/1 Garry Franklin Garrett v. ReconTrust 
Company, N.A., 2:ll-cv-763, at 3 (D. Utah, Dec. 21, 2011) (Addendum, Ex. G). 
Thus, because ReconTrust is not acting in contravention of the laws of the state in 
which it is located, the United States District Court granted ReconTrust's motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs' challenge to its authority to foreclose in that case. Id, at 3-4. 
Following the same rationale as the Garrett court, the trial court in this case 
should ultimately conclude that ReconTrust is a trustee authorized to conduct the 
foreclosure, including the sale, and the trial court did not err by awarding temporary 
possession to FNMA in light of the fact that it is the party most likely to prevail in 
this litigation. 
IV. FNMA's Request for Attorney's Fees is Unwarranted and Should Be 
Denied. 
Sundquist's request for attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine 
should be denied for several reasons. First, and foremost, Sundquist's appeal is without 
merit. Second, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.5 (Supp. 2009), attorney fees 
under the equitable private attorney general doctrine are no longer available to appellants 
11 
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like Sundquist, who filed her action after May 12, 2009. Thompson v. Logan City, 2009 
UT App 335, % 22, 221 P.3d 907. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.5 (Supp. 2009) 
("A court may not award attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine in any 
action filed after May 12, 2009."). Therefore, because Sundquist (1) raised her attorney's 
fees request for the first time, (2) failed sufficiently to brief the issue on appeal, and 
(3) brought this action after May 12, 2009, this Court should deny her request. 
However, even if attorney's fees were not otherwise precluded, Sundquist failed to 
preserve the issue by raising it before the trial court. As a general rule, the Court will not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 
98, ffi[ 42-43, 104 P.3d 1208, citing Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, \ 43 
n.17, 20 P.3d 307. In Crank, the Utah Supreme Court did not consider plaintiffs 
argument for an award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine, even 
though plaintiff mentioned the doctrine in a footnote and requested the opportunity to 
brief the issue upon the trial court's request. Id. In rejecting plaintiffs request for 
attorney's fees, the court held that "such a contingent offer of argument does not suffice 
to preserve an issue for appeal." Id. Sundquist has done less than the Crank plaintiff in 
that she never raised the issue for attorneys' fees under the private attorney general 
doctrine until this appeal. Accordingly, her request should be denied. 
Finally, assuming arguendo that the issue had been properly preserved, Sundquist 
has failed to sufficiently brief the issue on appeal. Because "it is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed," State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998), this court should reject appellee's request for 
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attorney fees. Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ffif 42-43. Specifically, Sundquist cited to Stewart v. 
Utah Pub, Serv, Comrn'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). However she fails to show how the 
invocation of this narrow exception is appropriate here. Stewart held that this doctrine is 
applicable only when the "vindication of a strong or societally important public policy 
takes place and the necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual plaintiffs 
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Id, at 783. (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, % 24, 100 P.3d 1151. Stewart further 
cautioned that to invoke this exception requires an "extraordinary case." Stewart, 885 
P.2d at 783 n.19. See also Faust v. KM Tech, Inc., 2000 UT 82, If 18, 15 P.3d 1266 
(holding that the private attorney general doctrine relied on in Stewart was "clearly 
inapplicable"). 
Sundquist fails to show that this case is an "extraordinary case," or that she is 
vindicating "a strong or societally important public policy." Her appeal merely benefits 
her personally because it is stalling the eviction and allowing her more time to live in a 
property for which she has indisputably not made mortgage payments for almost three 
years. R. 195, Hearing Trans, 5:13-6:6. Similarly, because Sundquist continues to live in 
the property, and has benefitted monetarily by asserting her counterclaims and this 
appeal, she cannot meet Stewarts second prong that "the necessary costs in doing so 
transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization." Accordingly, even if she could overcome the other barriers to this claim, 
she fails to show that this case is suitable for the application of the private attorney 
general doctrine. 
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CONCLUSION 
This appeal concerns only one issue: Did the trial court err by holding an 
immediate occupancy hearing and granting FNMA temporary possession of the Property, 
despite the fact that Sundquist had argued that ReconTrust was not an authorized trustee? 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should find that the trial court was correct to 
hold an immediate occupancy hearing, and that its decision to grant possession to FNMA 
during the course of this litigation was correct given the arguments and evidence 
presented during that hearing. 
Dated this 6th day of January, 2012. 
AKERMAN SENTERFITT LLP 
Robert H.Scott x f 
Chandler P. Thompson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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EXHIBIT A 
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Utah Code § 78B-6-810. Court Procedures. 
(1) In an action under this chapter in which the tenant remains in possession of the 
property: 
(a) the court shall expedite the proceedings, including the resolution of motions 
and trial; 
(b) the court shall begin the trial within 60 days after the day on which the 
complaint is served, unless the parties agree otherwise; and 
(c) if this chapter requires a hearing to be held within a specified time, the time 
may be extended to the first date thereafter on which a judge is available to hear the case 
in a jurisdiction in which a judge is not always available. 
(2) 
(a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment of rent or 
for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in Subsection 78B-6-802.5, 
the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon request of either party, within 10 days 
after the day on which the defendant files the defendant's answer. 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the 
litigation's pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be 
adjudicated without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues 
and enter judgment on the merits. 
(3) 
(a) In an action for unlawful detainer in which the claim is for nuisance and 
alleges an act that would be considered criminal under the laws of this state, the court 
shall hold an evidentiary hearing within 10 days after the day on which the complaint is 
filed to determine whether the alleged act occurred. 
(b) The hearing required by Subsection (3)(a) shall be set at the time the 
complaint is filed and notice of the hearing shall be served upon the defendant with the 
summons at least three calendar days before the scheduled time of the hearing. 
(c) If the court, at an evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection 
(3)(a), determines that it is more likely than not that the alleged act occurred, the court 
shall issue an order of restitution. 
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(d) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance with Subsection (3)(c), a 
constable or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff immediately. 
(e) The court may allow a period of up to 72 hours before restitution may be made 
under Subsection (3)(d) if the court determines the time is appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
(f) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (3)(a), if the 
court determines that all issues between the parties can be adjudicated without further 
proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and enter judgment on the merits. 
(g) "An act that would be considered criminal under the laws of this state" under 
Subsection (3)(a) includes only the following: 
(i) an act that would be considered a felony under the laws of this state; 
(ii) an act that would be considered criminal affecting the health or safety 
of a tenant, the landlord, the landlord's agent, or other person on the landlord's 
property; 
(iii) an act that would be considered criminal that causes damage or loss to 
any tenant's property or the landlord's property; 
(iv) a drug- or gang-related act that would be considered criminal; 
(v) an act or threat of violence against any tenant or other person on the 
premises, or against the landlord or the landlord's agent; and 
(vi) any other act that would be considered criminal that the court 
determines directly impacts the peaceful enjoyment of the premises by any tenant. 
(4) 
(a) At any hearing held in accordance with this chapter in which the tenant after 
receiving notice fails to appear, the court shall issue an order of restitution. 
(b) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance with Subsection (4)(a), a 
constable or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff immediately. 
(5) A court adjudicating matters under this chapter may make other orders as are 
appropriate and proper. 
(6) The expedited hearing provisions in this section do not apply to actions involving 
commercial tenants. 
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EXHIBIT B 
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12 U.S.C.A. g 92a, Trust Powers. 
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency. 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by 
special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or 
local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, 
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or in any other 
fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
come into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State 
in which the national bank is located. 
(b) Grant and Exercise of Powers Deemed Not in Contravention of State or Local 
Law. 
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or all of 
the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such powers by national 
banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within the meaning 
of this section. 
(c) Segregation of Fiduciary and General Assets; Separate Books and Records; 
Access of State Banking Authorities to Reports of Examinations, Books, 
Records, and Assets. 
National banks exercising any or all of the powers enumerating [FN1] in this 
section shall segregate all assets held in any fiduciary capacity from the general assets of 
the bank and shall keep a separate set of books and records showing in proper detail all 
transactions engaged in under authority of this section. The State banking authorities may 
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have access to reports of examination made by the Comptroller of the Currency insofar as 
such reports relate to the trust department of such bank, but nothing in this section shall 
be construed as authorizing the State banking authorities to examine the books, records, 
and assets of such bank. 
(d) Prohibited Operations; Separate Investment Account; Collateral for Certain 
Funds Used in Conduct of Business. 
No national bank shall receive in its trust department deposits of current funds 
subject to check or the deposit of checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other items for 
collection or exchange purposes. Funds deposited or held in trust by the bank awaiting 
investment shall be carried in a separate account and shall not be used by the bank in the 
conduct of its business unless it shall first set aside in the trust department United States 
bonds or other securities approved by the Comptroller of the Currency. 
(e) Lien and Claim Upon Bank Failure. 
In the event of the failure of such bank the owners of the funds held in trust for 
investment shall have a lien on the bonds or other securities so set apart in addition to 
their claim against the estate of the bank. 
(f) Deposits of securities for protection of private or court trusts; execution of 
and exemption from bond. 
Whenever the laws of a State require corporations acting in a fiduciary capacity to 
deposit securities with the State authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, 
national banks so acting shall be required to make similar deposits and securities so 
deposited shall be held for the protection of private or court trusts, as provided by the 
State law. National banks in such cases shall not be required to execute the bond usually 
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required of individuals if State corporations under similar circumstances are exempt from 
this requirement. National banks shall have power to execute such bond when so required 
by the laws of the State. 
(g) Officials' Oath or Affidavit. 
In any case in which the laws of a State require that a corporation acting as trustee, 
executor, administrator, or in any capacity specified in this section, shall take an oath or 
make an affidavit, the president, vice president, cashier, or trust officer of such national 
bank may take the necessary oath or execute the necessary affidavit. 
(h) Loans of Trust Funds to Officers and Employees Prohibited; Penalties. 
It shall be unlawful for any national banking association to lend any officer, 
director, or employee any funds held in trust under the powers conferred by this section. 
Any officer, director, or employee making such loan, or to whom such loan is made, may 
be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or may be both 
fined and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court. 
(i) Considerations determinative of grant or denial of applications; minimum 
capital and surplus for issuance of permit. 
In passing upon applications for permission to exercise the powers enumerated in 
this section, the Comptroller of the Currency may take into consideration the amount of 
capital and surplus of the applying bank, whether or not such capital and surplus is 
sufficient under the circumstances of the case, the needs of the community to be served, 
and any other facts and circumstances that seem to him proper, and may grant or refuse 
the application accordingly: Provided, That no permit shall be issued to any national 
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banking association having a capital and surplus less than the capital and surplus required 
by State law of State banks, trust companies, and corporations exercising such powers. 
(j) Surrender of authorization; board resolution; Comptroller certification; 
activities affected; regulations. 
Any national banking association desiring to surrender its right to exercise the 
powers granted under this section, in order to relieve itself of the necessity of complying 
with the requirements of this section, or to have returned to it any securities which it may 
have deposited with the State authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, or 
for any other purpose, may file with the Comptroller of the Currency a certified copy of a 
resolution of its board of directors signifying such desire. Upon receipt of such 
resolution, the Comptroller of the Currency, after satisfying himself that such bank has 
been relieved in accordance with State law of all duties as trustee, executory, [FN2] 
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, 
committee of estates of lunatics or other fiduciary, under court, private, or other 
appointments previously accepted under authority of this section, may, in his discretion, 
issue to such bank a certificate certifying that such bank is no longer authorized to 
exercise the powers granted by this section. Upon the issuance of such a certificate by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, such bank (1) shall no longer be subject to the provisions of 
this section or the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency made pursuant thereto, 
(2) shall be entitled to have returned to it any securities which it may have deposited with 
the State authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, and (3) shall not exercise 
thereafter any of the powers granted by this section without first applying for and 
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obtaining a new permit to exercise such powers pursuant to the provisions of this section. 
The Comptroller of the Currency is authorized and empowered to promulgate such 
regulations as he may deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this 
section and the proper exercise of the powers granted therein. 
(k) Revocation; Procedures Applicable. 
(1) In addition to the authority conferred by other law, if, in the opinion of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, a national banking association is unlawfully or 
unsoundly exercising, or has unlawfully or unsoundly exercised, or has failed for a 
period of five consecutive years to exercise, the powers granted by this section or 
otherwise fails or has failed to comply with the requirements of this section, the 
Comptroller may issue and serve upon the association a notice of intent to revoke 
the authority of the association to exercise the powers granted by this section. The 
notice shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the alleged unlawful or 
unsound exercise of powers, or failure to exercise powers, or failure to comply, 
and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether 
an order revoking authority to exercise such powers should issue against the 
association. 
(2) Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
section 1818(h) of this title, and subject to judicial review as provided in such 
section, and shall be fixed for a date not earlier than thirty days nor later than sixty 
days after service of such notice unless an earlier or later date is set by the 
Comptroller at the request of any association so served. 
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(3) Unless the association so served shall appear at the hearing by a duly 
authorized representative, it shall be deemed to have consented to the issuance of 
the revocation order. In the event of such consent, or if upon the record made at 
any such hearing, the Comptroller shall find that any allegation specified in the 
notice of charges has been established, the Comptroller may issue and serve upon 
the association an order prohibiting it from accepting any new or additional trust 
accounts and revoking authority to exercise any and all powers granted by this 
section, except that such order shall permit the association to continue to service 
all previously accepted trust accounts pending their expeditious divestiture or 
termination. 
(4) A revocation order shall become effective not earlier than the expiration 
of thirty days after service of such order upon the association so served (except in 
the case of a revocation order issued upon consent, which shall become effective 
at the time specified therein), and shall remain effective and enforceable, except to 
such extent as it is stayed, modified, terminated, or set aside by action of the 
Comptroller or a reviewing court. 
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Utah Code § 57-1-2L Trustees of Trust Deeds - Qualifications. 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within 
the state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or 
payoff the obligation secured by the trust deed; 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by 
both the trust deed and by law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust 
deed; or 
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the 
purchase of the property secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance 
company authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the 
laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually 
conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31 A, 
Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state; 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated 
by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide office 
within the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state: 
(i) that is open to the public; 
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(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; 
and 
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: 
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or 
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds. 
(c) This Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior 
to May 14,1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that trust deed. 
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 209, to this Subsection (1) 
apply only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the 
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi). 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee 
of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to create 
a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under the trust deed 
may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under 
Section 57-1-22. 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
OCC UNPUBLISHED INTERPRETIVE LETTER 
REFERENCE: LASD; 12 C.F.R. § 5.34; 12 U.S.C. § 92(a)] Trust Powers 
Comptroller of the Currency 
Administrator of National Banks 
Washington, D.C. 20219 
John Huffstutler, Senior Counsel 
Bank of America National Trust and Savings: Association 
Bank of America Center 
Box 3700 
San Francisco, California.94137 
June 13, 1986 
tENGTH: 474 words 
TEXT; Dear Mr. Huffstutler: 
This is in response to your notice, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1985), of a proposed expansion of the activities of Con-
tinental Auxiliary Company. ("Continental"), a wholly-owned'operating subsidiary of Bank of America National Trust 
and Savings Association ("Bank"). As explained in your letter, Continental presently acts as trustee under deeds of trust 
in favor of the Bank as Beneficiary. These deeds of trust secure real estate loans, made or.acquired by the Bank in the 
ordinary course of business. In serving as the Banks trustee for such loans, Continental also provides certain incidental 
services to the-Bank.For example, Continental on.behalf of the Bank conducts trustee sales, enters and takes possession 
of properties and collects rents, issues and profits from the property, and executes and delivers deeds of conveyance, and 
reconveyance, subordination agreements and other documents, instruments and agreements affecting deeds of trust and 
the properties that are subject to the deeds of trust 
According to this proposal, Continental would for a fee act as trustee under deeds of trust securing loans made or ac-
quired by nonaffiliated banks and financial institutions, providing the additional services such as those provided for the 
Bank itself The expanded activities would be.conducted from Continental's existing offices but would service lenders 
in both California and other states. 
The proposed new activities would be conducted from its existing offices at 3800 West Chapman Avenue, Orange, Cali-
fornia, Your letter states that in California, Continental may engage in its present and proposed activities without the 
need to obtain any state licenses and with further, capital, 
In your letter, you pointed out that Continental commenced its present activity in 1955 following notification to the 
Comptroller. In a letter dated December 10, 1973, the Comptroller confirmed Continental's status as an operating sub-
sidiary and its authority to engage in its present activities. The Bank has been authorized by die Comptroller to exercise 
trust powers under 12 U.S. Cr § 92(a), a power which Continental, as an operating subsidiary of the Bank, has been exer-
cising in the performance, of its activities. 
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Page 2 
We agree that the proposed activities are permissible for a national bank as an aspect of trust powers granted by 12 
U.S.C. § 92a. Under 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 a national bank may engage in activities which arc a part of or incidental to bank-
ing by means of an operating subsidiary. Based on the foregoing, Continental may extend the trustee activities discussed 
above to other lenders. 
Very truly yours, 
Michael Patriarca 
Deputy Comptroller for Multinational Banking 
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U.S. DISTRICT CC(/.?T 
REQEMB?
 A ,G: 
NQV(p$200r 
^ i / - i . 
Ronald G. Russell (4134) 
Matthew J. Ball (9414) 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-1537 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750
 RY. 
OFFICE OF ITS! 'mSTOtC^dWBSe-
BRUCE S.teNWtfS1' -•'•'» 
Eric P. Accomazzo, (Colo. Bar. 10840), pro hac vice 
Eric R. Coakley, (Colo. Bar. 34238), pro hac vice 
Bloom Murr & Accomazzo, P.C. 
41017th Street, Suite 410 
Denver, Colorado 80202-4402 
Telephone: (303) 534-2277 
Facsimile: (303)534-1313 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
JAYW.ZABRISKIE, 
NATALIE ARGYLE ZABRISKIE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, Nevada 
corporation, and, COUNTRYWIDE HOME 
LOANS, INC a New York corporation, 
Defendants. 
PROP0SB© ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS 
AND DENYING PLAINTD7FS' 
MOTION TO AMEND 
Case No: 2:08CV155 
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins 
This case is before the Court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) 
and plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 14). Plaintiffs, Jay W. 
Zabriskie and Natalie E. Argyle Zabriskie, brought this action seeking to render void a 
foreclosure sale of property they owned on grounds that defendant ReconTrust Company, an 
operating subsidiary of a Federal Savings Association, is prohibited from acting as a foreclosure 
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trustee in the state of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. 57-1-21 and U.GA. 12-1-1. ReconTrust 
Company conducted and administered the foreclosure sale for the foreclosing lender. Plaintiffs 
also assert claims for rescission of a foreclosure sale on grounds that there was a defect in the 
notice of foreclosure they received. For the reasons set out below, I grant the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the Complaint, 
L BACKGROUND 
ReconTrust Company is a Nevada corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in 
"trust, fiduciary or document custody services to the extent permitted by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision through Order, Application, or Registration." ReconTrust Company was, at the time 
relevant to this case, an operating subsidiary of Countrywide Bank, FSB, a federal savings 
association. 
On March 5, 2007, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") approved the conversion of 
Countrywide Bank, N.A. to a federal savings association. In doing so, it expressly approved an 
application for ReconTrust Company to act as a trustee for non-judicial foreclosure actions. The 
OTS approved the application for ReconTrust Company to "act as a trustee in non-judicial 
actions and performf] sales activities associated with mortgage foreclosure activities, provide[] 
lien release services to release the interests of a lender, and provide partial release and 
subordination services." Upon examination of the relevant criteria, the OTS concluded that 
"there is an adequate basis to approve the trust powers application." On September 4, 2007, the 
Office of Thrift Supervision authorized ReconTrust Company to operate as a fiduciary trustee 
under the supervision of the OTS. Regarding ReconTrust Company's ability to act as a trustee, 
the OTS approved the core activities of ReconTrust Company: 
1, Provide lien release, subordination and related services, and 
submit documents to release lenders' interests; 
2 
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2. Act as a trustee in non-judicial foreclosure actions and 
perform sales activities in conjunction with mortgage 
foreclosures for residential lenders; 
3. Provide post-closing partial release and loan term 
modification services; and, 
4. Perform document custody services for residential lenders. 
On March 30, 2001, in order to refinance a property informally known as 387 North 300 
West, Mount Pleasant, Utah, 84647, the Zabriskies borrowed $92,000.00 from Full Spectrum 
Lending, Inc. The Zabriskies signed an Adjustable Rate Note acknowledging the debt. As 
security for the Mortgage, the Zabriskies signed a Deed of Trust in favor of Full Spectrum 
Lending, Inc., secured by the Property. The Deed of Trust expressly provided that, in the case of 
default, the lender or its nominee had the right to accelerate the loan and to sell the Property. 
Under the Note and Deed of Trust, the Zabriskies were required to make payments to the lender 
beginning on June 1, 2001. 
Mortgage Electric Registration System ("MERS") is a separate entity that was named in 
the Deed of Trust to act "solely as a nominee for the Lender and the Lender's successors and 
assigns." As one court has described, "MERS administers an electronic registry to track the 
transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans, serving as mortgagee of 
record and holding legal title to mortgages in a nominee capacity." In re Huggins, 357 B.R. 180, 
183(Bnkr. D. Mass. 2006) (citations omitted). The Deed of Trust provided that "The 
beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's 
successors and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS." The Deed of Trust executed 
by the borrowers provided that: 
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title 
to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, 
3 
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but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as 
nominee for the Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has 
the right: to exercise any or all of those interests including, but not 
limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take 
any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, 
releasing and canceling this Security Instrument. 
On or about May 30, 2001, Fannie Mae purchased the loan from Full Spectrum Lending 
Corporation and became the "Lender" with regard to the note and Deed of Trust for the Property. 
Countrywide Home I ^ oans, Inc. ("Countrywide") was the loan servicer of the Zabriskie Loan 
pursuant to a loan servicing agreement with Fannie Mae, Under the loan servicing agreement, 
Countrywide had the authority to administer the loan, collect payments, and, if necessary, to 
recover the money Fannie Mae had loaned to the borrowers by initiating foreclosure proceedings 
in the event of default. 
In July of 2007, the borrowers defaulted on their repayment obligations under the 
mortgage. On October 3, 2007, MERS executed a "Substitution of Trustee". Under Utah law, 
the beneficiary of a trust deed may appoint a successor trustee at any time by recording a 
substitution of trustee. See, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-22(1 )(a). The Deed of Trust also provided 
that "[w]ithout conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, 
power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law." The Substitution of 
Trustee was recorded on October 5, 2007. The Substitution of Trustee appointed ReconTrust 
Company as successor trustee under the Deed of Trust. 
On or about October 5, 2007, ReconTrust Company recorded a Notice of Default and 
Election to Sell dated October 3, 2007. On October 15, 2007, copies of the Substitution of 
Trustee and Notice of Default and Election to Sell were mailed via certified mail to the 
borrowers at three different addresses. On January 4, 2008, ReconTrust Company issued a 
Notice of Trustee's Sale on behalf of MERS setting the trustee's sale for February 5, 2008. On 
4 
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January 7, 2008, Robert Henningson of the Sanpete County Sheriffs Department posted a copy 
of the Notice of Sale on the property. The Notice of the Trustee's Sale was also published 
weekly in the Sanpete Messenger, a newspaper of general circulation published weekly at Manti, 
Sanpete County, Utah from January 9, 2008 to January 23, 2008. On January 11, 2008, copies of 
the Notice of Sale were mailed, via certified mail, to the borrowers at the property address and 
also to two different P.O. Boxes in Mt. Pleasant. 
Plaintiffs argue that they received only some of the notices that Defendants testified were 
sent and posted. However, Plaintiffs do acknowledge that "[o]n Monday, January 7, 2008, [a] 
Notice of Trustee Sale was posted on the front door of Plaintiffs home in Mount Pleasanf* and 
that "[o]n Monday, January 14, 2008, [Plaintiffs] received a certified letter from ReconTrust 
notifying them of the impending trustee's foreclosure sale." Plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiff Zabriskie's Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Application 
for Preliminary Injunction in which they also acknowledged that they received: (1) A certified 
letter that was delivered to their Post Office; (2) A notice of sale that was posted on their property on 
January 7,2008; (3) A notice of sale that was delivered to them at the property by certified mail on 
January 14,2008; and (4) Two additional copies of the notice of sale by mail between January 17th 
and 21st. 
On February 5, 2008, at 1:00 p.m. ReconTrust Company, through its agent the law firm 
of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, held a trustee's sale at the West Foyer on the West 
Steps of the Sanpete County Courthouse, 160 North Main, Manti, Utah. At the foreclosure sale, 
FNMA was the successful bidder with a credit bid of the full amount of the loan, $101,342.35. 
No other purchasers appeared at the sale. On February 7, 2008, a Trustee's Deed was issued to 
5 
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FNMA. The Trustee's Deed was recorded on February 12, 2008. On February 7, 2008, MERS 
assigned all beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to FNMA. 
IL STANDARDS 
A» Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed, R. civ. P. 56(c). The 
moving party bears the initial burden of showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support 
the non-moving party's case." Celotex v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 
2d 265 (1986), This burden may be met by identifying portions of the record which show an 
absence of evidence to support an essential element of the opposing party's case. Johnson v. City 
of Bountiful, 996 F. Supp 1100, 1102 (D. Utah 1998). Once the moving party satisfies its initial 
burden, "the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing sufficient to establish 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of [the disputed] element," 
Id Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires a nonmovant "that would bear the burden of 
persuasion at trial" to "go beyond the pleadings and 'set forth specific facts' that would be 
admissible in evidence in the event of a trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the 
nonmovant." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). The specific facts 
put forth by the nonmovant "must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition 
transcript or a specific exhibit incorporated therein." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling, 968 
F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992). Mere allegations and references to the pleadings will not 
suffice. However, the Court must "examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 
F.3d 756,759 (10th Cir. 1999). 
6 
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B. Pro-se Parties 
Although a federal court may construe a pro se plaintiffs pleadings liberally, a court 
should not "supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiffs complaint or construct 
a legal theory on plaintiffs behalf" Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 R3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 
1997)(quotations omitted). The Court must not act as a pro se litigant's advocate. Hall v. 
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 
DI. ANALYSIS 
A, Federal Preemption 
Plaintiffs contend that ReconTrust Company was prohibited from acting as a foreclosure 
trustee for the sale of the Property because it does not meet state requirements as set forth at 
U.CA, § 57-1-21. Plaintiffs also allege that, in order to act as a foreclosure trustee, ReconTrust 
Company was required to register as a debt collector pursuant to U.CA, § 12-1-1. ReconTrust 
Company argues that, because it is the operating subsidiary of a federal savings association and 
is supervised and authorized by the OTS to act as a foreclosure trustee, those Utah statutes are 
preempted by federal law. I agree. 
The doctrine of federal preemption of state law originates with the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, which states: 
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof, . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
In determining whether a state law is preempted by federal law, the Court must ascertain 
the intent of Congress. Bank of Am, v. City & County o/S.E, 309 F.3d 551, 557-558 (9th Cir. 
7 
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2002), re-hearing denied en banc, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26376, cert denied 538 U.S. 1069, 
citing to Cal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). State law is 
preempted by federal law in three circumstances. First, the state law is preempted if such 
preemption is explicitly contemplated by the federal statute in question. English v. General 
Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Second, the state law is preempted if the statute was 
intended to "occupy the field", that is, if the statute regulates an area of policy over which 
Congress intended the federal government to have exclusive control. Id. This form of 
preemption is referred to as field preemption. Third, federal law preempts state law when the 
two laws conflict such that it is impossible to comply with both at once or such that the state law 
conflicts with the goals of the federal statute. Id. 
There is a general presumption that state law is not preempted. However, the 
presumption is not invoked when the state regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (U.S. 2000). Because 
there has been a history of significant federal presence in the area of national banking, the 
presumption against preemption of state law is inapplicable here. Barnett Bank N.A, v. Nelson, 
517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996); Franklin Nat. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1954). 
The federal law governing federal savings associations and their subsidiaries is the Home 
Owners' Loan Act of 1933 ("HOLA"), now codified at 12 U.S.C, § 1461, et seq. HOLA was 
enacted "in an effort to ameliorate the deplorable condition of the home-financing industry in the 
1930's after the failure of 1,700 state chartered savings and loan institutions." WFSFin,, Inc., 29 
F. Supp.2d at 1025, citing to de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 160. Congress enacted HOLA ;tto restore 
the public's confidence in savings and loan associations at a time when 40% of home loans were 
in default," Bank of America, 309 F.3d at 559. The act was intended to be "a radical and 
8 
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comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state systems." de la Cuesta, 458 
U.S. at 160. 
To this end, Congress created a system of federal savings and loan associations to be 
regulated by a federal agency. WFS Fin., Inc., 79 F. Supp.2d at 1025. The OTS is the agency 
charged with responsibility for the administration and enforcement of HOLA. 12 C.F.R. § 
500.1(a); see also, 12 C.F.R. § 500.10 (the functions of the OTS are to "charter, supervise, 
regulate and examine Federal savings associations11); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 144 (noting that 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the predecessor to the OTS, was created in 1932 to 
administer the HOLA). Pursuant to HOLA, the OTS has the power to pass regulations to 
"provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of . . . 
Federal savings associations . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1464. HOLA authorizes the OTS to promulgate 
regulations "appropriate to carry out [its] responsibilities." 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (a)(2). Pursuant to 
this authorization, the OTS regulates, inter alia, "the enforcement of laws, regulations, or 
conditions against such associations." 12 C.F.R. § 500.1(b). The OTS has broad discretion to 
promulgate regulations that are "appropriate to carry out [its] responsibilities." 12 U.S.C. § 
1463(a)(2). 
ReconTrust Company is an operating subsidiary of Countrywide Bank, FSB, a federal 
savings association. After notifying the OTS an operating subsidiary of a federal savings 
association may engage in any activity that its parent association may conduct. See 12 C.F.R. § 
559.3(e). An operating subsidiary of a federal savings association "is subject to the same federal 
regulations as its parent and is treated as a department or division of its parent for regulatory 
purposes." WFS Fin., Inc., 19 F. Supp.2d at 1026 and see 12 C.F.R. § 559.3(h). Furthermore, an 
9 
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operating subsidiary of a federal savings association is entitled to the same preemption rights as 
its parent association. See 12 C.F.R. § 559.3(n). 
A federal savings association's authority to act as a trustee in non-judicial foreclosure 
actions derives from section 5 (n) of HOLA. That section states, 
The Director may grant by special permit to a Federal savings 
association applying therefore the right to act as trustee, executor, 
administrator, guardian, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which 
state banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete 
with Federal savings associations are permitted to act under the 
laws of the State in which the Federal savings association is 
located. 
12U.S.C. 1664(n)(l). 
ReconTrust Company is authorized by the OTS to act as a trustee in connection with non-
judicial foreclosures, On March 5, 2007, the OTS approved the conversion of Countrywide 
Bank, N.A. to a federal savings association and in doing so expressly approved the application 
for ReconTrust Company to act as a trustee in non-judicial foreclosures. Accordingly, 
ReconTrust Company may act as a foreclosure trustee to the same extent to which state banks, 
trust companies, or other corporations which compete with federal savings associations are 
permitted to act under the laws of the state in which ReconTrust Company is located. 
ReconTrust Company is located in Texas. Under Texas Law, state banks and trust companies 
are permitted by statute to act as a trustee for a foreclosure sale. Tex. Fin. Code §§ 32.001 & 
182.001; Tex. Prop. Code §§ 51.0074 & 51.0001(8). 
Plaintiffs argue that because their Property was located in the state of Utah, ReconTrust 
Company should be deemed to be located there. This argument is at odds with the express 
purpose of preemption, which is to allow federal savings associations to perform activities "in 
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States . . .free from undue 
10 
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regulatory duplication and burden . . . in accordance with a uniform scheme of Federal 
regulation." 12 C.F.R. § 550.136(a), emphasis supplied. To hold that a federal savings 
association is located in the place where a borrower's property is located would undermine the 
uniform scheme of federal banking regulation. Plaintiffs' argument is also contrary to the 
express language of 12 U.S.C. 1664(n)(l), which provides that it is the laws of the state in which 
the federal savings association is located, not the state in which a foreclosed property is located. 
The uncontradicted testimony in this case is that the trustee activities for the foreclosure were 
conducted in Texas. Under Texas law, state banks and trust companies are permitted by statute 
to act as a trustee to administer a foreclosure sale. Tex. Fin. Code §§ 32.001 & 182.001; Tex. 
Prop. Code§§ 51.0074 & 51.0001(8). 
Plaintiffs also argue that the laws of the state of ReconTrust Company's principal place 
of business, California, should apply. However, Plaintiffs fail to identify any California statute 
that would operate to preclude ReconTrust Company from acting as a trustee in a foreclosure 
sale. See, e.g. Cal. Civ, Code § 2932 (the power of sale may be conferred upon the mortgagee or 
"any person"). This argument is also not persuasive because there is no evidence ReconTrust 
Company is located in Utah for purposes of 12 U.S.C. 1664(n)(l). 
Having determined that the HOLA and OTS regulations permit ReconTrust Company to 
act as a trustee in foreclosure sale transactions the Court must consider the effect of Utah law on 
that authority. Field preemption is implied when the scheme of federal regulation in a particular 
field is so pervasive as to leave no room for the states to supplement it. Rice v, Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). "Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect 
than federal statutes." de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153. The regulation of federal savings 
associations by the OTS is so "pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control." 
11 
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Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan Assos. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979). The 
OTS has occupied the field of federal regulation of the fiduciary activities of federal savings 
associations to the maximum extent possible: 
Occupation of field. To enhance safety and soundness and to 
enable Federal savings associations to conduct their fiduciary 
activities in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions 
in the United States (by effectively delivering fiduciary services to 
the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden), 
OTS occupies the field of the regulation of the fiduciary activities 
of Federal savings associations. In so doing, OTS intends to give 
Federal savings associations maximum flexibility to exercise their 
fiduciary powers in accordance with a uniform scheme of Federal 
regulation. Accordingly, Federal savings associations may 
exercise fiduciary powers as authorized under Federal law, 
including this part, without regard to State laws that purport to 
regulate or otherwise affect their fiduciary activities, except to the 
extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1464(n) (State laws regarding scope 
of fiduciary powers, access to examination reports regarding trust 
activities, deposits of securities, oaths and affidavits, and capital) 
or in paragraph (c) of this section. For purposes of this section, 
"State law" includes any State statute, regulation, ruling, order, or 
judicial decision. 
12 CJF.R. § 550.136(a), emphasis added, Thus, state laws that prohibit or restrict a federal 
savings association, or its operating subsidiary, from exercising its federal powers to act as 
trustee, to solicit trust business, or that require state approval or license to do so, are in conflict 
with federal law and are preempted. 
Plaintiffs contend that under U.CA. § 57-1-21(3), only an attorney or title insurance 
company may exercise the power of sale in a foreclosure action and that a federal savings 
association, or its operating subsidiary, is prohibited from doing so. Because U.CA, § 57-1-21(3) 
prohibits or restricts a federal savings association from exercising its federal powers to act as a 
trustee, the Court finds that it conflicts with federal law and is preempted by HOLA and the 
regulations promulgated by the OTS. 
12 
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Plaintiffs contend that Utah laws that would have the effect of prohibiting a federal 
savings association from acting as a foreclosure trustee are not preempted under 12 CF.R. 
550.136(c) because such laws may be classified as "real property law". That section identifies 
"real property law" as a type of laws that "are not preempted to the extent that they only 
incidentally affect the fiduciary operations of a Federal savings associations or are otherwise 
consistent with the purposes of paragraph (a)..." 12 CF.R. 550.136(c). 
This section does not, as Plaintiffs contend, exclude all state real property law from pre-
emption. Rather, section (c) excludes state laws only to the extent that they incidentally affect a 
federal savings' association's ability to act as a foreclosure trustee. Even if a state statute is of a 
category identified in 12 CF.R. 550.136(c), it will be preempted if it has more than an incidental 
effect on a federal savings associations exercise of its powers. Plaintiffs argue that U.C.A. § 57-
1-21(3) should be read to preclude or restrict ReconTrust Company from conducting foreclosure 
sales. The Court finds that this is more than an incidental effect. Under the express terms of 
section (c), any Utah law that is asserted as a basis to preclude or restrict in any way ReconTrust 
Company's power to act as a foreclosure trustee is preempted. 
Plaintiffs also contend that Utah law requires ReconTrust Company to register and post a 
bond as a "collection agency" under U.C.A. § 12-1-1 in order to conduct the trustee activities 
authorized by federal law. As an initial matter, this claim fails because the statute does not apply to 
ReconTrust Company, an operating subsidiary of a federal savings association, pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 12-1-7. Also, OTS regulations specifically provide that "[ejxamples of State laws that are 
preempted by the HOLA and this section include those regarding registration and licensing..." 12 
CF.R. § 550.136(b). Thus, even if U.C.A. § 12-1-1 was applicable to a federal savings association 
under Utah law, ReconTrust Company may exercise its federal powers to act as a foreclosure 
13 
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trustee without regard to Utah's restrictions or requirements on registration and licensing because they 
are preempted by federal law. 
B. Foreclosure Notices Were Adequate. 
Plaintiffs also seek to rescind the foreclosure sale on the grounds that the notices sent by 
ReconTrust Company were insufficient. A trustee's failure to strictly follow the statutory notice 
requirements incident to a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding does not automatically result in 
the invalidation of a foreclosure sale. An imperfectly-noticed sale will only be set aside if the 
trustee's failure to observe the statutory notice obligations "ha[s] the effect of chilling the 
bidding and causing an inadequacy of price" resulting in extreme injustice to the trustor. 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987) (citation 
omitted). This is so because u[t]he objective of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of the 
property. If that objective is obtained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the 
sufficiency of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto." Id. Notwithstanding any errors in a 
notice of a foreclosure sale, a foreclosure will not be unwound in cases where the trustor and 
potential bidders have actual notice of the sale. See, see id., at 1160; Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d 
699, 705-706 (Utah 2003). 
In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs had actual notice of the foreclosure sale. 
Plaintiffs stated in their Complaint that "On Monday January 7,2008, Notice of Trustee Sale was 
posted on front door of Plaintiffs' home in Mount Pleasant." In other filings with this Court, 
Plaintiffs have also alleged that "[o]n Monday January 14, 2008, [they] received a certified letter 
from ReconTrust [Company] notifying them of the impending trustee's foreclosure sale." 
Complaint at If 10. In another filing with this Court, Plaintiffs assert that: (1) they received, but 
ignored, a certified letter delivered to their Post Office box; (2) a notice of sale was posted on 
14 
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their property on January 7, 2008; (3) a notice of sale was delivered to them at the property by 
certified mail on January 14, 2008; and (4) they received two additional copies of the notice of 
sale by mail between January 17th and 21st. There is also no dispute that notice of the sale was 
published weekly in the Sanpete messenger. Because Plaintiffs acknowledge they had actual 
notice of the foreclosure sale, the sale cannot be set aside. 
C. Motion to Amend 
A party may amend its pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party;.. ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A court may deny a motion to amend for failure to file 
a copy of the proposed amended complaint. See Lambertsen v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 79 
F.3d 1024, 1029-30 (10th Cir. Utah 1996). Without the proposed complaint, it is impossible for 
the Court to determine its viability. See id Even pro se plaintiffs' motion to amend a complaint 
may be denied for failing to provide a proposed amendment. See generally, Jackson v. Zavaras, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91749 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2007) (Denying without prejudice zpro se 
plaintiffs motion to amend complaint for failure to submit the proposed amendment). 
The Court may also deny a motion to amend based on the procedural posture of the case. 
If defendants have filed dispositive motions based on the plaintiffs original complaint, the court 
may deny the amendment as it would unduly delay resolution of those motions. See generally AH 
v, Dinwiddle, 2008 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 8151 at *34 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 2008) (denying the 
plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint since the defendants previously filed dispositive 
motions based on the original complaint). 
Plaintiffs in this case have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that justice requires 
that they be granted leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to file a copy of the 
proposed amended complaint with their motion. In their motion, Plaintiffs made only the vague 
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assertion that they wish to include "additional defendants, federal, state, and equitable claims." 
In their reply, plaintiffs concede that they "are still trying to figure out" if they were damaged 
under various state laws as well as non-existent "federal tort laws." Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
motion to amend is denied, 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is entered in favor or defendants ReconTrust Company and 
Countywide Home Loans, Inc., and against plaintiffs Jay W. Zabriskie and Natalie A. Zabriskie 
as to all of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint is denied. Plaintiffs' 
claims are dismissed with prejudice. A * y I U^H^A- b - * r * 4 ^ A fiCCtccKu^ . 
So ORDERED this jj^_ day of November, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce S. 
United States Senica'District Judge 
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Dated this 24th day of October, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLOOM MURR & ACCOMAZZO, P.C 
s/Eric R. Coakley 
By: 
Eric P. Accomazzo (CO Bar #10840), Pro Hac Vice 
Eric R. Coakley (CO Bar #34238), Pro Hac Vice 
410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 410 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303)534-2277 
Facsimile: (303)534-1313 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS P.C. 
Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Matthew J. Ball (9414) 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-1537 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants ReconTrust Company and 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2008,1 electronically filed the foregoing 
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND with served on the 
following by sending a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid: 
Jay W. Zabriskie 
Natalie E. Argyle Zabriskie 
387 North 300 West 
P.O. Box 192 
Mt. Pleasant, UT '84647 
s/ T. Link Hutchinson 
T. Linn Hutchinson, Paralegal 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
JEREMY COLEMAN, DWAYNE 
WATSON, SAMUEL ADAMSON, ETHNA 
LYNCH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
AND DENYING IN PART MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
CaseNo.2:10-cv-1099 
Judge Dee Benson 
Before the court is Defendants ReconTrust Company, N.A., Mortgage Electronic 
Systems, Inc., Bank of America, N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Bank of New York Mellon's (collectively referred to as 
"Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 45.) The court 
heard oral argument on the motion. E. Craig Smay and John Christian Barlow represented the 
plaintiffs. J. William Boland and Philip Dracht represented, the Defendants. After considering 
the memoranda, including the exhibits on file, and the oral arguments, the court enters the 
following order. 
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Defendants claim the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that MERS, HSBC, Wells Fargo, and 
Bank of New York Mellon were involved in the conduct giving rise to any claims. "A claim has 
facial plausibility when the [plaintiff pleads] factual content that allows the Court to draw [a] 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct 1937,1949 (2009). The only specific factual statements about MERS, HSBC, Wells 
Fargo, and Bank of New York Mellon are in the section of the Amended Complaint describing 
the Defendants' organizational status and stating they conduct business in the state of Utah, 
Thereafter, the only references are general statements regarding all of the Defendants. The 
allegations do not reference a specific property, plaintiff, or foreclosure proceeding and are 
insufficient to give MERS, HSBC, Wells Fargo, and Bank of New York Mellon "fair notice of 
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to MERS, HSBC, 
Wells Fargo, and Bank of New York Mellon is GRANTED. Regarding ReconTrust, Bank of 
America, N.A., and BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, the court finds that the Plaintiffs have 
plead sufficient allegations against them to survive a motion to dismiss. 
In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that ReconTrust may properly 
foreclose on properties located in Utah pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92a. Defendants argue that for 
purposes of § 92a the laws of the state of Texas apply, not Utah law. The court does not agree. 
Instead, the court agrees with the reasoning applied in Cox v. ReconTrust Company, NA., 2011 
WL 835893 (March 3, 2011 D. Utah). In that case, the court stated: 
Under a straight forward reading of § 92a(b), this court must look to Utah law 
in its analysis of whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed ReconTrust's trustee . 
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powers. The powers granted to ReconTrust under federal law in this case are limited 
by the powers granted by Utah state law to ReconTrust's competitors. Accordingly, 
the extent of ReconTrust's federal powers must be determined by reference to the 
laws of Utah, not by reference to the laws of some other state. Under Utah law, the 
power to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure is limited to attorneys and title 
companies. The scope of the powers granted by federal law is limited to the same 
power Utah statute confers on ReconTrust's Utah competitors. The federal issue, 
therefore, is whether ReconTrust is a competitor of Utah attorneys or title insurance 
companies. 
Id, at *6. 
Because the parties did not brief the issue of whether ReconTrust competes with Utah 
attorneys or title insurance companies, the court will not rule on that matter at this time. 
For the reasons mentioned above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 
n ^ pertek** 
is o>-^3ay otSeetember DATED this i ^ a y f eptnibec, 2f011. 
UUt / / ( ^LCc l 
• T>W— 
Dee Benson 
United States District Judge 
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTR|AJg.DJ^|rDC( 
*>*!*/&-& * * * * * * * * * 
Z0IIDEC2I A 10: 2h 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * HkA^JL * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GARRY FRANKLIN GARRETT, )D|S Tfi.'CT 0 F ^ ^ ° - 2:11CV00763 DS 
Plaiatiff, . ^WfcLERK "-•., 
vs.' ) ORDER 
) 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., 
Defendant. 
) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The motion before the court is Defendant ReconTrust Company, N.A/s 
(ReconTrust) motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed, R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6). Defendant 
claims Plaintiff Garrett fails to state a claim against ReconTrust as a matter of law, 
Plaintiff Garry Garrett brought claims against Defendants concerning a $271,100,00 loan 
Mr. Garrett obtained that was secured by a deed of trust recorded on September 12,2007 in Utah 
County against the property, Garrett defaulted on this loan in August 2010. Upon default, 
ReconTiiist, as substitute trustee on the deed of trust* recorded a notice of default and election to 
sell in the Utah County recorder's office on November 4,2010 indicating Garrett had failed to 
make his payment on the underlying note from August 2010 through November 2010. On June 
2, 2011, ReconTrust sold the property at a foreclosure sale to Federal National Mortgage 
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Association (Fannie Mae) and subsequently recorded a Trustee's Deed and a corporate 
assignment of deed of trust to Fannie Mae. 
Plaintiff s claim is that ReconTrust is unauthorized to conduct foreclosure sales in the 
State of Utah as they are not a qualified trustee pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 574-21(3), 
Plaintiffs second claim is that ReconTrust slandered title to the property by conducting the non-
judicial foreclosure sale without being qualified to do so, again pursuant to UTAH CODfi ANN. § 
57-1-21(3), The Court finds that all of Plaintiff s arguments are without merit and therefore 
grants the Motion to Dismiss. 
IL STANDARD OF REVIEW . 
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual 
allegations, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party.1 Plaintiffs* complaint "must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face/"2 
However, the court "need not accept... conclusory allegations without supporting factual 
averments."3 
1
 GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381,1384 (10th Cir> 1997). 
2
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949 (U.S. 2009). 
3
 S. Disposal, Inc., v. Tex. Waste, 161 F,3d 1259,1262 (10th Cir. 1998). 
2 
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IIL ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs claim that ReconTrust conducted an unauthorized sale because it is not a 
qualified trustee under UTAH CODE ANN, § 57-1-21(3) fails because ReconTrust is a national 
banking association operating under the federal National Bank Act (NBA) and is regulated by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). NBA specifies under 12 U,S.C. § 92a(a) that 
the state law applicable to ReconTrust's authority to act as trustee is the state law where the bank 
is "located," which in this case is Texas, rather than Utah, rendering UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1 -
21(3) inapplicable. 
Section 92a of the NBA ties the state law at issue in this case to where the national bank 
is "located," Additionally, the OCC has interpreted that phrase to mean a national bank is 
"located" only where it "acts in a fiduciary capacity." 12.C.FJR, §§ 9.7(b) and (e)(1). 
ReconTrust performs all fiduciary duties at issue in this case in Texas. The OCC regulations 
define acting in a fiduciary capacity as "the state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, 
executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions 
regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets," 12 Ci\R, § 9,7(d). 
Here, ReconTrust performs the functions specified in this regulation for Utah properties 
in Texas. Therefore, the state laws that apply to ReconTrust by virtue of Section 92a are those of 
Texas, rather than Utah, Since Texas law permits national banks to act as trustee under the deeds 
of trust and to exercise the power of sale with regard to such deeds of trust (See TEX, FIN. CODE 
ANN. §§.32.001,182.001; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.0001,51.0074.), ReconTrust is not 
3 
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"acting in contravention of State Law" of the state in which it is "located" for purposes of 12 
U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C<F,R. § 9 J when it performs trustee sales with respect to Utah properties. 
Therefore, because all Plaintiff s claims rely on Hie theory that ReconTrust was 
unauthorized to conduct foreclosure sales in the State of Utah and this court finds this argument 
has no merit as a matter of law, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted with prejudice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants* Motion to Dismiss 
with prejudice, 
SOORDERED, 
DATED this JUJ davof tk***M*> .2011. 
BYTHECOURT; 
DAVID SAM 
SENIOR JUDGE 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
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